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We explore the various claims made by Freeman and Medoff (FM) in their famous book What do
unions do? about the impact of unions on wages and update them with new and better data. The
main findings are as follows. 1) Private sector union wage premium is lower today than it was in the
1970s. 2) The union wage premium is counter-cyclical. 3) There is evidence of a secular decline in
the private sector union wage premium. 4) There remains big variation in the premium across
workers. 5) There is big variation in industry-level union wage premia. 6) State level union wage
premia vary less than occupation and industry level premia. 7) Union workers remain better able
than non-union workers to resist employer efforts to reduce wages when market conditions are
unfavorable. 8) There has been a decline in the unadjusted wage gap relative to the regression-
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 “Everyone ‘knows’ that unions raise wages.  The questions are how much, 
under what conditions, and with what effects on the overall performance of 
the economy”.  What Do Unions Do?,  Freeman and Medoff, 1984, p.43 
 
In 1984 Richard Freeman and James Medoff (FM) published their pathbreaking book What Do 
Unions Do?.  The book has had an enormous impact.  According to Orley Ashenfelter, one of the 
commentators in a review symposium on the book published in January 1985 in the Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review, 38(2), pages 245-258, the response of the popular press to the book 
‘has only been short of breathtaking’ (p.245)
1.  It received rave reviews at the time it was written 
and unlike most books has withstood the test of time: it is certainly the most famous book in 
labor economics and industrial relations.  One of the other reviewers in the symposium, Dan 
Mitchell called it ‘a landmark in social science research’ and so it has proved (p.253).  We went 
to the Social Science Citations Index and typed in ‘What do unions do’ (henceforth WDUD) and 
found it had been cited by other academics more than one thousand times
2.   In what follows we 
will show that the vast majority of their commentary written in the early 1980s is still highly 
applicable today despite the fact that private sector unionization has been in precipitous decline 
since they put pen to paper or maybe it was even fingers to keyboard!  An old adage is that a 
classic book is one that everyone talks about but nobody reads.   This book is not one of those.  It 
is a classic in the true sense because it continues to be a book that anyone – scholar or layman - 
interested in labor unions needs to read!   2 
Central to the thesis propounded by FM there are two faces to unions – the undesirable 
monopoly face – which enables unions to raise wages above the competitive level which results 
in a loss of economic efficiency.  This inefficiency arises because employers adjust to the higher 
union wage by hiring too few workers in the union sector.  The second more desirable face to be 
examined in detail by others in this volume, is the collective voice face which enables unions to 
channel worker discontent into improved workplace conditions and productivity.  This chapter 
concentrates on the monopoly face of unions and its impact on relative wages.  We explore the 
various claims made by FM about the impact of unions on wages and update them with new and 
better data.   
We examine in some detail the role of the public sector, which was largely ignored by 
FM.  This was a perfectly understandable omission at the time but is less appropriate today given 
the importance of public sector unionism in the US.
3  In Section One we report FM’s main 
findings.  In Section Two we discuss the main labor market changes that have occurred since 
WDUD was written.  Section Three reports our estimates of wage gaps disaggregated by various 
characteristics used by FM.  We also examine wage gaps that FM did not examine, namely those 
in the public sector and for immigrants. Section Four examines time series changes in the union 
wage gap.  Section Five models the determinants of changes in the union wage premium at the 
level of the industry, occupation and state.  In Section Six we outline our main findings and 
discuss whether FM would have been surprised about these findings when they wrote WDUD.   
1.  Summary of FM’s findings on union wage effects.  
FM reported that early work used aggregate data on different industries, occupations and areas.  
Much of this work was summarized in Lewis (1963).  The reason that such aggregated data were 
used was that ‘data on the wages of unionized versus non-unionized individuals or 
establishments was neither available nor, given the state of technology, readily amenable to 3 
statistical analysis’ (1984, p.44).  These studies found a union wage effect on average of 10-15%.  
The more recent studies FM examined, including a number of their own, used micro data at the 
level of the establishment but more usually at that of the individual.  In Table 3.1 FM showed 
that the union differential in the 1970s was 20-30% using cross-section data (the 7 numbers in 
the table averaged out at 25.3%). Such estimates may still suffer from bias because differences 
due to the skills and abilities of workers are wrongly attributed to unions.  FM also considered 
‘before and after’ comparisons and argued that, although they represent a way to eliminate 
ability bias they also suffer from measurement error problems derived from mismeasurement of 
the union status measure (Hirsch, 2003).  FM reported 12 estimates using panel data in their 
Table 3.2 for the 1970s: these are sizable but smaller than the cross-section estimates they 
examined, averaging out at 15.7%
4. 
FM used data from the May 1979 Current Population Survey (CPS) to obtain a series of 
disaggregated estimates using a sample of non-agricultural private sector blue-collar workers 
aged 20-65.  They reported that unions raise wages most for the young, the least tenured, whites, 
men, the least educated, blue collar workers and in the largely unorganized South and West
5.  
Further FM found, using data for 62 industries from the 1973-1975 May CPS that  there was 
considerable variation in the size of the differential
6.   
FM argued that the amount of monopoly power held by unions is related to the wage 
sensitivity of the demand for organized labor.  The smaller response of employment to wages the 
greater they argued is the ability of unions to raise wages without significant loss in employment.  
Areas where employment is less responsive to wage changes such as air transport they argued 
should be where one would expect to find sizable gains. 
FM went on to argue that the differential likely depends on the extent to which the union 
is able to organize a big percentage of workers – the higher the percentage the higher the 4 
differential (p51).  FM found that for blue collar workers in manufacturing a 10% increase in 
organizing generates a 1.5% increase in union wages. In contrast, they argued that the wages of 
nonunion workers do not appear to be influenced by the percentage workers organized.  In terms 
of the characteristics of firms and plants FM obtained the following results. 
a) Union differentials depend on the extent to which the firm bargains for an entire sector rather 
than for individual plants within a sector.   
b) Wage differentials tend to fall with size of firm/plant/workplace.   
c) There was no clear empirical evidence on the relationship between product market power and 
differentials primarily as it is so difficult to measure power.  
In terms of macro changes in differentials FM found that the 1970s were a period of 
increases in the union wage premium. FM conjectured that a possible explanation was the 
sluggish labor market conditions prevailing at the time.  Wages of union workers, they argued, 
tend to be less sensitive to business cycle ups and downs – particularly due to three year 
contracts.  This implies the union wage premium moves counter-cyclically – high in slumps 
when the unemployment rate is high and low in booms when the unemployment is low.   
However, FM found that inflation and unemployment explained less than 50% of the rising 
union differentials in the 70s.  Nor they argued did the rising wage differentials of the 1970s 
represent an historical increase in union power.  The early 80s according to FM were a period of 
‘givebacks’ where unions agreed to wage cuts. Union wage gains, according to FM were NOT a 
major cause of inflation. 
FM ended chapter three by estimating the social cost of monopoly power of unions.  Loss 
of output due to unions they found to be ‘quite modest’:  accounting for between 0.2% and 0.4% 
of GNP or between $5 billion and $10 billion. 
FM drew six conclusions on the union wage effect.  5 
a)  The common sense view that there is a union wage effect is correct. 
b)  The magnitude of the differential varies among people, markets and time periods. 
c)  Variation in the union wage gap across people is best understood by union standard rate 
policies arising from voice.   
d)  Variation in the union  wage gap across markets is best understood by union monopoly power 
and employer product market power. 
e) Wage premia of 1970s were substantial but they returned to more ‘normal’ levels in the 1980s. 
f)  Social loss due to unions is small. 
2. Changes in the Labor Market Since WDUD 
Union density rates in the US have fallen rapidly from 24% in 1977 to 13% in 2002 (Hirsch and 
Macpherson, 2002)
7.  The decline was most dramatic in the private sector where in 2002 less 
than 1 in 10 workers are union members.  Density remains higher in manufacturing than in 
services. However, Table 1 suggests that union membership has roughly the same disaggregated 
pattern in 2001 as it did in 1977 – union density is higher among men than women; for older 
versus younger workers; in regions outside the South; and in transportation and communication 
and construction.  The exceptions are by race, where in 1977 rates were higher among non-
whites but there is little difference by 2001, and by schooling.  In 1977 membership rates for 
those with below high school education were nearly double those with above high school 
education.  In 2001 they were approximately the same. So the highly qualified have increased 
their share of union employment. 
The number of private sector union members declined over the period 1983-2002 
whereas the number of public sector union members actually increased (Table 2).  Due to the 
growth in total employment in the public sector, however, the proportion of public sector 
workers who were union members was exactly the same in 2001 and 1983 (37%)
8.  By 2002, 6 
46% of all union members in the US were to be found in the public sector compared with 32.5% 
in 1983. 
3. Union wage gaps since WDUD 
3.1. What has happened to the union wage differential between 1979 and 2001?   
Table 3 presents union wage gaps obtained from estimating a series of equations for each of the 
major sub-groups examined by FM who used the 1979 May CPS file on a sample of non-
agricultural private sector blue-collar workers aged 20-65.  Their sample was very small, being 
limited to around 6,000 observations.  Rather than use the estimates reported by FM to ensure 
large sample sizes we decided to pool together 6 successive May CPS files from 1974-1979 and 
then compare those to wage gaps estimated for the years 1996-2001 using data from the Matched 
Outgoing Rotation Group (MORG) files of the CPS.  Columns 1 and 2 estimate wage gaps for 
the private sector for 1996-2001 and 1974-1979 respectively.  Columns 3 and 4 present 
equivalent estimates for the sample used by FM of non-agricultural private sector blue-collar 
workers aged 20-65.   
Hirsch and Schumacher (2002) show a ‘match bias’ in union wage gap estimates due to 
earnings imputations
9.  This bias arises because workers in the CPS have earnings imputed using 
a “cell hot deck” method.  This means that wage gap estimates are biased downward when the 
attribute being studied (e.g. union status) is not a criterion used in the imputation. By construction, 
the individuals with imputed earnings have a union wage gap of close to zero; hence omitting 
them raises the size of the union wage gap.  They show that standard union wage gap estimates 
such as reported in Blanchflower (1999) are understated by about 3 to 5 percentage points as a 
result of including individuals who have had their earnings imputed.  
Unfortunately, it is not a simple matter to exclude those individuals with imputed 
earnings in a consistent way over time
10.  Here we follow the procedure suggested by Hirsch and 7 
Schumacher (2002) and that we used in Blanchflower and Bryson (2003).
11  All allocated earners 
are identified and excluded for the years 1996-2001 in the MORG files. Because the May CPS 
sample files available to us do not report allocated earnings in 1979-81, the series are adjusted 
upward by the average bias (of .033) found by Hirsch and Schumacher using these May CPS 
data for 1979-81. Earnings were not allocated in the years 1973-1978.  For the period 1973-1979 
total sample size was approximately 184,000 compared with 547,000 for the later period.  In 
each year from 1996-2001 there are approximately 130,000 observations for the private sector in 
the MORG; in the May files, sample sizes are approximately 31,000. 
Comparing FM’s sample and the wider private sector sample for the 1970s (columns 4 
and 2 respectively in Table 3), FM’s sample generates a larger wage gap for all, with the 
exception of the least educated
12.  The difference between the two samples is large, with the FM 
sample generating a premium for the whole private sector which is a third larger (28% as 
opposed to 21%) than in the wider sample.  However, patterns in the wage gaps across workers 
are similar. 
a)  By sex, there is little difference in the size of the gap. 
b)  By age, the union effect is U-shaped in age and largest among the youngest who tend to be 
the lowest paid 
c)  By tenure, the pattern is a similar U-shape. 
d) By education, unions raise wages most for the least educated, with the most highly educated 
having the lowest premium. 
e) By race, unions raise wages by a similar amount for whites and non-whites. 
f)  By occupation, although not reported in column 4, FM (1984: 49-50) report larger gains for 
blue-collar than for white-collar workers.  The manual/non-manual gap in column 2 bears this 
out. 8 
g)  By region, unions had the largest effects in the relatively unorganized South and West, with 
more modest effects in the relatively well organized Northeast. 
h)  By industry, Construction and Services have the highest premia. 
What has happened since the 1970s?   
i)  By sex, the wage gap has declined for women, but remained roughly stable for men so that, by 
the late 1990s, the union wage gap was higher for men than for women.  The rate of decline in 
women’s union premium is underestimated in FM’s restricted sample, but is still apparent. 
j)  By age, the U-shaped relationship apparent in the 1970s has disappeared because there has 
been a precipitous decline in the premium for the youngest workers, while older workers’ wage 
gap has remained roughly constant. In the full private sector sample, young workers still benefit 
most from union wage bargaining, though this is not apparent in FM’s restricted sample. 
k)  By tenure, as in the case of age, the U-shaped relationship between tenure and the union 
premium apparent in the 1970s has disappeared, because low and high tenured workers have 
seen their wage gap fall substantially while middle-tenure workers have experienced a stable 
union wage gap.  Now, it seems the premium declines with tenure. 
l)  By education, the lowest educated continue to benefit most from union wage bargaining, but 
not to the same degree as in the 1970s.  Although the trend is not so apparent in FM’s sample, 
the wage gap has fallen most for high-school drop-outs 
m)  By race, a three percentage point gap has opened up between the union premium 
commanded by non-whites and the lower premium for whites 
n)  By occupation, the union premium has collapsed for non-manual workers.  Despite some 
decline in the premium for manuals, their wage gap was 17 percentage points larger than that for 
non-manuals by the late 1990s (compared with only 5 percentage points in the 1970s) 9 
o)  By region, the wage gap remains largest in the West and the South though, in FM’s sample, 
there is no difference in the premium in the South and Central regions.  The wage gap remains 
smallest in the Northeast. 
p)  By industry, the wage gap remains largest in Construction and smallest in Manufacturing. 
The decline in the differential was particularly marked in Services. We return to industry 
differentials later 
Two points stand out from these analyses. First, no group of workers in the broader 
private sector sample has experienced a substantial increase in their union premium.  Indeed, 
the only group recording any increase at all is those aged 45-54 who see their premium rise from 
13% to 14%.  Clearly, unions have found it harder to maintain a wage gap since FM wrote.  
Second, with the exception of the manual/non-manual gap, those with the highest premiums in 
the 1970s saw the biggest falls, so there has been some convergence in the size of wage gaps.  
This finding is apparent whether we compare trends using FM’s sample (columns 3 and 4) or the 
broader private sector sample (columns 1 and 2). This trend may be due to an increasingly 
competitive US economy, where workers commanding wages well above the market rate are 
subject to intense competition from non-union workers.  Nevertheless, with the exception of the 
most highly educated and non-manual workers, the wage premium remains around 10% or more.  
3.2. Public sector 
FM said little or nothing on the role of unions in the public sector, although, as noted above, 
Freeman has subsequently written voluminously on the issue.  Given that the remaining bastion 
of unionism in the US is now in the public sector, it is likely if FM were writing today they 
would have devoted a considerable amount of space in a twenty-first century edition of WDUD 
to the public sector.  So we did some of it for them: more evidence on how the role of unions in 10 
the public sector since WDUD was written is presented by Morley Gunderson in another chapter 
in this volume.   
It is apparent from Table 2 above that the size of the public sector grew (from 15.6 
million to 19.1 million or 22.4%) over the period 1983-2001 but as a proportion of total 
employment it fell from 18.0% to 16.1%.  Union membership in the public sector grew even 
more rapidly (from 5.7 million to 7.1 million or by 24.6%).  As we noted earlier, by 2001 public 
sector unions accounted for 44% of all union members compared with 32.5% in 1983. 
Table 4 is comparable to Table 3 above for the private sector in that it presents 
disaggregated union wage gap estimates.  Because sample sizes in the public sector are small 
using the May CPS files we once again decided to use data from the ORG files of the CPS for 
the years 1983-1988 for comparison purposes with the 1996-2001 data.  It was not possible to 
use data for the years 1979-1982 as no union data are available.  A further advantage of using the 
1983-1988 data is that information is available on those individuals whose earnings were 
allocated who were then excluded from the analysis.  The main findings are as follows. 
1) The private sector union wage gap has fallen over the two periods (21.5% to 17.0%) whereas 
a slight increase was observed in the public sector (13.3% to 14.5% respectively). 
2) The majority of the worker groups in Table 4 experienced increases in the size of their union 
wage premium over the two periods, but wage gaps declined markedly for those under 25 and 
with less than a high school education. 
3) There was little change in public sector union wage gaps for men or women.  In marked 
contrast to the private sector where men had higher differentials than women, wage gaps in both 
periods in the public sector were higher for women than for men. 
4) Unions benefit workers most in local government and least in the federal government although 
the differential for federal workers increased over time.
13 11 
5) Just as was found for the private sector, the wage benefits of union membership are greatest 
for manual workers, the young and the least educated.  
6) There are only small differences in union wage gaps for non-whites compared to whites in 
both the public and the private sectors. 
7) In contrast to the private sector where wage differentials were greatest in the South and West, 
in the public sector exactly the opposite is found.  Higher differentials are found in the public 
sector in New England and the Central region in both time periods whereas the reverse was the 
case in the private sector. 
8)  Wage gaps increased over time for teachers, lawyers, firefighters and police.   
3.3 Immigrants
14 
FM also said nothing about the extent to which labor unions in the US are able to sign up 
immigrants as members and then by how much they are able to raise their wages.  Using the data 
available in the CPS files since the mid-1990s we calculate wage gaps for the period 1996-
2001.We find little variation in union wage gaps by length of time the immigrant had been in the 
US, holding characteristics constant as well as wage gaps for the US born. However, differentials 
by source country are large.  Differentials for Europeans (11.6% for Western Europe and 12.7% 
for Eastern Europe) are well below those of the native born (16.8%).  Estimates are also in low 
double digits for Asians, Africans and South Americans (13.3%, 11% and 12.2% respectively). 
In contrast the wage gap for Mexicans is 28%.  
4.  Time series changes in the union wage gap. 
FM reported that the 1970s was a period of rising differentials for unions, although they did not 
separately estimate year by year results themselves.  Table 5, which is taken from Blanchflower 
and Bryson (2003) and is reproduced by permission
15, reports adjusted estimates of the wage gap 
using separate log hourly earnings equations for each of the years from 1973 to 1981 using the 12 
National Bureau of Economic Research’s (NBER) May Earnings Supplements to the CPS 
(CPS)
16 and for the years since then using data from the NBER’s  (MORG) files of the CPS
17.  
The MORG data for the years 1983-1995 were previously used in Blanchflower (1999)
18.  For 
both the May and the MORG files a broadly similar, but not identical, list of control variables is 
used, including a union status dummy, age and its square, a gender dummy, education, race and 
hours controls plus state and industry dummies19.   
The first column of Table 5 reports time-consistent estimates of union wage gaps for the 
total sample while the second and third columns report them for the private sector.  To solve the 
match bias problem discussed above, as we did in Tables 3 and 4 we followed the procedure 
suggested by Hirsch and Schumacher (2002) and described in the footnote to Table 5. Results 
obtained by Hirsch and Schumacher (2002) with a somewhat different set of controls are 
reported in the final column of the table.  For a discussion of the reason for these differences see 
Blanchflower and Bryson (2003).  The time series properties of all three of the series are 
essentially the same. 
The wage gap averages between 17 and 18 per cent over the period, and is similar in size 
in the private sector as it is in the economy as a whole. The table confirms FM’s comment (1984: 
53) that ‘the late 1970s appear to have been a period of substantial increase in the union wage 
premium’.  What is notable is the high differential in the early to mid 1980s and a slight decline 
thereafter, which gathers pace after 1995, with the series picking up again as the economy started 
to turn down in 2000.   
Table 6 presents estimates of both the unadjusted and adjusted union wage gaps for the 
private sector.  The sample excludes individuals with imputed earnings.  In column 1 of the 
Table we report the results of estimating a series of wage equations by year that only include a 
union dummy as a control.  These numbers are consequently different from those reported by 13 
Hirsch and Macpherson (2002, Table 2a) who report raw unadjusted wage differences between 
the union and non-union sectors but do not exclude individuals with imputed earnings
20. 
Throughout the unadjusted wage gap is higher than the adjusted wage gap, implying a positive 
association between union membership and wage enhancing employee and/or employer 
characteristics.  However, the unadjusted gap has declined more rapidly than the regression-
adjusted gap since 1983.  In 1983 the unadjusted estimate was 128% higher than the adjusted 
estimate: in 2002 the difference had fallen to 91.5% higher. 
To establish what is driving this effect, Hirsch, Macpherson and Schumacher (2002) 
decompose the unadjusted wage gap into its three components – employment shifts, changes in 
worker characteristics, and in the residual union wage premium.  Using CPS data for the private 
sector only, they find almost half (46%) of the decline in the union-nonunion log wage gap over 
the period 1986-2001 is accounted for by a decline in the regression-adjusted wage gap.  Sixteen 
per cent of the decline is accounted for by changes in worker characteristics and payoffs to those 
characteristics, chief among these being the increase in the union relative to nonunion percentage 
of female workers.  The remaining 38% of the decline in the unadjusted wage gap Hirsch, 
Macpherson and Schumacher found was due to sectoral shifts and payoffs to the sectors workers 
are located in.  The sectoral changes that stand out are the substantial decline in union relative to 
nonunion employment in durable manufacturing, and the decline in relative pay (that is, the 
industry coefficient) in Transportation, Communications and Utilities, a sector with a large share 
of total union employment. 
The results reported in Table 5 are broadly comparable to the estimates obtained by H. 
Gregg Lewis (1986) in his Table 9.7, which summarized the findings of 165 studies for the 
period 1967-79.  Lewis concluded that during this period the US mean wage gap was 
approximately 15 per cent.   His results are reported below
21:   14 
Year         # studies           mean estimate         Year          # studies           mean estimate 
1967  20                     14%        1973              24                  15% 
1968  4  15%        1974                7                   15% 
1969  20  13%        1975              11                   17% 
1970  8  13%        1976                7                     16% 
1971  20  14%        1977               10                    19% 
1972  7  14%        1978                 7                     17% 
            1979                 3                     13% 
 
The left panel contains estimates for the six years prior to our starting point in Table 5.  It does 
appear that the unweighted average for this first period, 1967-72, of 14 per cent is slightly below 
the 16% for the second interval, 1973-79.  The estimates for the later period are very similar to 
those we obtained in Table 5 – which also averaged 16 per cent – and have the same time-series 
pattern.  In part, the low number Lewis obtained for 1979 is explained by the fact that the 1979 
May CPS file included allocated earners and hence the estimates were not adjusted for the 
downward bias caused by the imputation of the earnings data
22. 
Figure 1 plots the point estimates of the union wage premium for the US, taken from the 
first column of Table 5, against unemployment for 1973-2002. The premium moves counter-
cyclically.  There are three main factors likely influencing the degree of counter-cyclical 
movement in the wage gap.  The first, cited by FM (1984: 52-53) as the reason for the widening 
wage gap during the Depression of the 1920s and 1930s, is the greater capacity for unionized 
workers to  ‘fight employer efforts to reduce wages’ when market conditions are unfavorable.  
Conversely, when demand for labor is strong, employees are less reliant on unions to bargain for 
better wages because market rates rise anyway.  The second factor is the fact that union contracts 
are more long-term than non-union ones and, as such, less responsive to the economic cycle.  
This means that union wages respond to economic conditions with a lag.   
When inflation is higher than expected, this can result in a greater contraction in the 
premium because non-union wages are more responsive to higher inflation.  However, the third 
factor, which should reduce the cyclical sensitivity of the union wage premium, is the cost-of-15 
living-adjustment (COLA) clauses in union contracts that increase union wages in response to 
changes in the consumer price level.  According to FM (1984: 54) the percentage of union 
workers covered by these agreements rose dramatically in the 1970s, from 25% at the beginning 
of the decade to 60% at the end of the decade.  However, FM’s estimates for manufacturing 
suggest that COLA provisions ‘contributed only a modest amount to the rising union advantage’ 
in the 1970s.  Bratsberg and Ragan (2002) revisit this issue and find the increased sensitivity of 
the premium to the cycle is due in part to reduced COLA coverage from the late 1980s, but we 
find no such evidence (see below).  
Commenting on the growth of the union wage premium during the 1970s, FM (1984: 54) 
suggested that “at least in several major sectors the union/nonunion differential reached levels 
inconsistent with the survival of many union jobs”.  They were right.  In the 1970s and early 
1980s, the wage gap in the private sector rose while union density fell, as predicted in the 
standard textbook model of the way that employment responds to wages where the union has 
monopoly power over labor supply.  In the classic monopoly model, demand for labor is given, 
so a rise in the union premium will result in a decline in union membership since the premium 
hits employment.  The fact that unions pushed for, and got, an increasing wage premium over 
this period, implies that they were willing to sustain membership losses to maintain real wages, 
or that unions were simply unaware of the consequences of their actions.   
From the mid-1990s, the continued decline in union density was accompanied by a 
falling union wage premium.  This occurred because demand for union labor fell as a result of 
two pressures.  The first was increasing competitiveness throughout the US economy: increasing 
price competition in markets generally meant employers were less able to pass the costs of the 
premium onto the consumer, so that pressures for wages to conform to the market rate grew.   
Secondly, unionized companies faced greater nonunion competition. Declining union density, by 16 
increasing employers’ opportunities to substitute non-union products for union products, fuelled 
this process.  So too did rising import penetration: if imports are non-union goods, then 
regardless of union density in the US, they increase the opportunity for non-union substitution.   
These same pressures also increased the employment price of any union wage gap (what 
economists call the elasticity of demand for unionized labor).  
5.  Industry, occupation and state-level wage premia 
So far, we have focused primarily on union wage effects at the level of the individual and the 
whole economy.  However, the literature on the origins of the union wage premium focuses 
largely on firms and industries.  This is because the conventional assumption is that unions can 
procure a wage premium by capturing quasi-rents from the employer (see Blanchflower, Oswald 
and Sanfey, 1996 for more on this).  If this is so, there must be rents available to the firm arising 
from their position in the market place, and unions must have the ability to capture some of these 
rents through their ability to monopolize the supply of labor to the firm.  Individual-level data 
can tell us little about these processes.  Instead, the literature has concentrated on industry-level 
wage gaps.  In this section we model the change in the union wage premium at three different 
units of observation - industry, state and occupation. 
5.1. Industries. 
As we noted above FM reported wage gap estimates by the extent of industry unionism. They 
(1984: 50) comment on substantial variation in the union wage effect by industry, with gaps 
ranging between 5% and 35% in the CPS data for 1973-75.  FM’s results are reported in the first 
column below.  We used our data to estimate separate results by two digit industry for 1983-
1988 and 1996-2001.  We chose these years as it was possible to define industries identically 
using the 1980 industry classification.  Using these data we also found considerable variation by 
the size of the wage gap by industry.   17 
Estimates by industry    FM 1973-5  1983-88  1996-‘01            
<5%       13 11 10 
5-15%         17 15 19   
15-35%         24 12 12   
>=35%         8 6 3   
#  industries   62 44 44   
 
There is less variation in the wage gap by industry in the later period than in the earlier period 
with only 3 industries, construction (41%), transport (36%) and repair services (37%) having a 
differential of over 35%, compared with 6 in the earlier period which includes the same three - 
construction (52%); transport (44%); repair services (37%) – plus agricultural services (41%); 
other agriculture (56%) and entertainment (47%).
23    
Where is the union wage premium rising, and where is it falling?  The details are 
presented in Table 7. It shows the regression-adjusted wage gaps in 44 industries during the 
1980s (1983-1988) and then in the late 1990s (1996-2001).  In contrast to the analysis by worker 
characteristics, which reveal near universal decline in the premium – at least in the private sector 
– it shows the wage gap rose in 17 industries and declined in 27.  The gap rose by more than ten 
percentage points in autos (+12%) and leather (+19%).  It declined by more than twenty 
percentage points in other agriculture (-33%) retail trade (-20%) and private households (-29%).  
Table 7 also shows that many of the industries experiencing a rise in the union premium between 
1983 and 2001 would have been subject to intensifying international trade (Machinery, Electrical 
Equipment, Paper, Rubber and Plastics, Leather) but this is equally true for those experiencing 
declining premiums (such as Textiles, Apparel and Furniture). Horn (1998) found that increases 
in import competition led to increases in union density and decreases in the wage premium 
within manufacturing industries.  This occurred because union density fell slower than overall 
employment when faced with import competition.  Horn also found that imports from OECD 
countries decreased union density, while imports from non-OECD countries tended to raise 
union density within an industry.   18 
There is a negative correlation between change in union density and change in the 
premium (correlation coefficient –0.39).  Some of the biggest declines in the premium have been 
concentrated in the sectors where the bulk of private sector union members are concentrated, as 
the table below indicates.  It shows the only three industries with more than a 10% share in 
private sector union membership in 2002.  In Construction and Transport, which both make up 
an increasing proportion of all private sector union members, the premium fell by around 10 
percentage points.  In Retail Trade, where the share of private sector union membership has 
remained roughly constant at 10%, the premium fell 20 percentage points. 
 Share  of 
membership, 1983 
     Share of   
membership, 2002 
     Change in 
Premium, 1983-2001 
Construction 9.3  13.5  -10.7 
Retail trade  10.2  10.5  -20.3 
Transport 9.7  12.3  -8.0 
 
The decline in the wage gap for the whole economy, presented earlier, is due to the fact that the 
industries experiencing a decline in their wage gap make up a higher percentage of all employees 
than those experiencing a widening gap. The results are similar to those presented by Bratsberg 
and Ragan (2002).  They find that, over the period 1971-1999, the regression-adjusted wage gap 
closed in 16 industries and increased in 16 others.  Their analysis is not directly comparable to 
ours, but where industry-level changes are presented in both studies, they tend to trend in the 
same direction. Only in one industry (Transport Equipment) do Bratsberg and Ragan report a 
significant increase in the wage gap where we find a decline in the wage gap.   
These changes in the union wage premium by industry over time are worth detailed 
investigation, even though FM did not present such analyses.  Our first step was to estimate 855 
separate first-stage regressions, one for each of our 45 industries in each year from 1983-2001 
with the dependent variable the log hourly wage along with controls for union membership, age, 
age squared, male, 4 race dummies, the log of hours and 50 state dummies. The sample was 19 
restricted to the private sector and excluded all individuals with allocated earnings. Three sectors 
with very small sample sizes (toys, tobacco and forestry and fisheries) were deleted. We 
extracted the coefficient on the union variable, giving us 19 years * 42 industries or 798 
observations in all.  The adjustments discussed earlier were made to deal with imputed earnings. 
The coefficient on the union variable was then turned into a wage gap taking anti-logs, deducting 
1 and multiplying by 100 to turn it into a percentage. We used the ORG files to estimate the 
proportion of workers in the industry who were union members
 both in the private sector and 
overall and mapped that onto the file.  Unemployment rates at the level of the economy are used 
as industry specific rates are not meaningful: workers move a great deal between industries and 
considerably more than they do between states.  (A table providing information on the 
classification of industries used and the average number of observations each year is available on 
request from the authors).  Regression results, reported in Table 8, columns 1 and 2, estimate the 
impact of the lagged premium, lagged unemployment and a time trend on the level of the 
industry-level wage premium.  The number of observations is 756 as we lose 42 observations in 
generating the lag on the wage premium and the union density variables.   
In the unweighted equation in column (1) we find the lagged premium is positively and 
significantly associated with the level of the premium the following year indicating regression to 
the mean.  Unemployment and the time trend are not significant.  However, once the regression 
is weighted by the number of observations in the industry in the first stage regression, (column 
(2)) lagged unemployment is positive and significant, indicating counter-cyclical movement in 
the premium, while the negative time trend indicates secular decline in the premium. 
Bratsberg and Ragan (2002) reported that the industry-level premium was influenced by a 
number of other variables.
24  In particular they found that COLA clauses reduced the cyclicality 
of the union premium and that increases in import penetration were strongly associated with 20 
rising union premiums
25.  They also found some evidence that industry deregulation had mixed 
effects. Their main equations (their Table 2) did not include a lagged dependent variable.  Table 
9 reports results using their data for the years 1973-1999 using their method and computer 
programs that they kindly provided to us.  Column 1 of the Table reports the results they reported 
in column 2 of their Table 2.  Column 2 reports our attempt to replicate their findings.  We are 
unable to do so exactly – the problem appears to arise from the use of the xtgls routine in 
STATA which gives different results on our two machines
26.  There are several similarities – we 
find import penetration both in durables and non-durables, COLA clauses, deregulations in 
communications and the unemployment rate all have positive and significant effects.  We also 
found as they did that deregulation in Finance lowered the premium.  In contrast to Bratsberg 
and Ragan, however, the inflation rate and the two interaction terms with the unemployment rate 
were insignificant.  The model is rerun in column 3, but without the insignificant interaction 
term.  A linear time trend is added in column 4: this is negative and significant, and eliminates 
the COLA effect and the negative effect of deregulation in the finance sector.  Column 5 adds the 
lagged union wage premium, which is positive and significant.  Its introduction makes inflation 
positive and significant. In columns (6) to (8) models are run without the four insignificant 
deregulation dummies.  Column (6) indicates that, using an unweighted regression, the size of 
the lagged premium effect drops markedly and the time trend and inflation lose significance, 
showing these results are sensitive to the weighting of the regression.  The smaller coefficient on 
the lagged dependent variable is unsurprising given that there is much less likely to be variation 
in the union wage gap estimates in industries with large sample sizes that have higher weights in 
the former case. We are able to confirm Bratsberg and Ragan’s finding that the unemployment 
rate, deregulation in Communications and import penetration in both durables and non-durables 21 
have positive impacts on the premium but not the findings on COLA, inflation or any of the 
other deregulations identified.   
The fact that we find import penetration in durable and non-durable goods sectors 
increases the premium suggests that union wages are more resilient than non-union wages to 
foreign competition. Import penetration is likely correlated with unmeasured industry 
characteristics that depress the premium inducing a negative bias that is removed once industry 
characteristics are controlled for.  Import penetration has likely reduced demand for union and 
non-union labor, with union wages holding up better than non-union wages, but at the expense of 
reduced union employment.  There are theoretical and empirical reasons as to why this might 
occur.  For instance, since union wages tend to be less responsive to market conditions generally, 
it may be that union wages are sluggish in responding to increased competition from imports.  
Alternatively, industries characterized by ‘end-game’ bargaining may witness perverse union 
responses to shifts in product demand as the union tries to extract maximum rents in declining 
industries (Lawrence and Lawrence, 1985).  Another possibility is that increased import 
penetration reduces the share of union employment in labor intensive firms, increasing it in 
capital intensive firms. Greater capital intensity reduces elasticity of demand for union labor, 
allowing rent maximising unions to raise the premium (Staiger, 1988). 
It isn’t obvious that weights should be used if we regard each industry as a separate 
observation.  In cross-country comparisons which, say compared outcomes for Switzerland, the 
UK and the US it wouldn’t make a lot of sense to weight by population and thereby make the 
observation from the US 4.67 times more important than that of the UK and 39.3 times more 
important than Switzerland
27.  Columns (1) to (6) are GLS estimates accounting for potential 
correlation in error terms.  Column (7) switches to a weighted OLS and shows results are not 
sensitive to the switch.  The unweighted OLS in column (8) gives broadly the same results as the 22 
unweighted GLS in column (6).  Taking off the weights has a much bigger impact than switching 
from GLS to OLS.  
Further, the industries defined by Bratsberg and Ragan are very different in size.  Some 
industries are very broadly defined – for example industry 32 Services covers SIC codes 721-900 
while Tobacco, for example covers one SIC code #130.  Retail Trade averaged 19,075 
observations.  Column 9 of Table 9 illustrates the sensitivity of the results to industry exclusions.  
It is exactly equivalent in all respects to column 5 of the Table except that it drops the 32 
observations from Retail Trade.  The lagged dependent variable falls dramatically from .60 to 
.32.  The COLA variable is now significantly positive while the inflation variable moves from 
being significantly positive to insignificant.  The unweighted results (not reported) are little 
changed.  Bratsberg and Ragan’s results appear to be sensitive to both the use of weights and the 
sample of industries used.   
5.2. States  
In the US unions are geographically concentrated by town, county, district and state.  Often 
towns next to each other differ – one is a union town, the other is non-union.  Waddoups (2000) 
used this interesting juxtaposition of union and non-union zones to estimate the impact of unions 
on wages in Nevada’s hotel-casino industry.
28  Although they share many features, and are 
subject to broadly similar business cycles, most of the 51 states in the US are comparable in size 
and economic significance to many countries.  They also differ markedly in their industrial 
structures and unionization rates.  Assuming union density proxies union bargaining power, this 
implies different premiums across states.  However, as noted earlier, FM found the union 
premium at regional level was inversely correlated with union density, with the premium highest 
in the relatively unorganized South and West.  To explore this issue further, and to assess 
changes over time, we estimated separate wage gaps for two time periods at the level of the 50 23 
states plus Washington DC.  Results at the level of the state are reported in Table 10, and are 
summarized in the table below. The data used are from the Outgoing Rotation Group files of the 
CPS.  It was not possible to identify each state separately in the May CPS so FM did not report 
such results.  Hence, we compared results from a merged sample of the 1983-1988 with those 
obtained from our 1996-2001 files. The penultimate column in the table presents changes in 
union density in the each state.
29  The correlation between changes in state density and state 
premia is negative but small (-0.10).  
Estimates by state    1983-8  1996-01            
<5%       0  0     
5-15%     6  21   
15-35%     43 30   
>=35%     2 0 
# states (+DC)    51  51 
 
The first thing we notice is that the variation in the union wage premium is much less by state 
than it is by industry.  Only two states in the earlier period had gaps of at least 35% - North 
Dakota (35%) and Nebraska (37%) and none in the later period.   There has been a downward 
shift in the premium generally, as indicated by the movement from the 15-35% category to the 5-
15% category.  The mean state union wage gap was 23.4% between 1983 and 1988, falling by 
6.2 percentage points to 17.2% in 1996-2001. The premium fell in all but five states, with South 
Dakota recording the biggest decline (16.8 percentage points).  In four of the five states where 
the premium rose, it only increased by a percentage point or two (Vermont, Massachusetts, 
Wyoming, Hawaii).  The premium only rose markedly in Maine, where it increased 9 percentage 
points (from 7% to 16.1%).  Since the early 1980s, union density fell by an average of 5.7 
percentage points, with Pennsylvania (-10.6%) and West Virginia experiencing the biggest 
decline (-11 percentage points). The premium appears to have declined more in smaller states 
than it has in bigger states.     It is apparent from Table 10 that the five biggest states of 
California, Texas, Florida, New York and Illinois had small changes in their wage gaps (-1.4%; -24 
6.7%;  -10.1%; –0.6% and –4.5% respectively).  The five smallest states measured by 
employment tended to have big declines in the differentials: New Mexico (-14.10%); Alabama (-
14.20%); Nebraska  (-15.00%); Arkansas (-15.20%); South Dakota (-16.80%).
30. 
We then ran 969 separate first-stage regressions, one for each state in each year from 
1983-2001 with the dependent variable the log hourly wage along with controls for union 
membership, age, age squared, male, 4 race dummies, the log of hours and 44 industry dummies. 
The sample was restricted to the private sector and allocated earnings were dealt with as 
described earlier.  We extracted the coefficient on the union variable, giving us 19 years * 51 
states (including D.C.) or 969 observations in all.  We then mapped to that file the 
unemployment rate in the state year cell
31. Once again we ran a series of second-stage 
regressions where the dependent variable is the one year change in the premium (obtained by 
taking anti-logs of the union coefficient and deducting one) on a series of RHS variables 
including the lagged premium and lagged unemployment and union density rates
32. Results are 
reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 8.  The number of observations is 918 as we lose 51 
observations in generating the lag on the wage premium and the union density variables.   Both 
unweighted and weighted results are presented where the weights are total employment in the 
state by year. Controlling for state fixed effects with 50 state dummies we find that, with an 
unweighted regression (column (3)) the lagged premium is positive and significant, as it was at 
industry-level.  Again, as in the case of industry-level analysis, the effect is apparent when 
weighting the regression (column (4)).  The positive, significant effect of lagged state-level 
unemployment confirms the counter-cyclical nature of the premium: the effect is apparent 
whether the regression is weighted or not.  There is also evidence of a secular decline in the 
state-level premium, but only where the regression is unweighted. 25 
State fixed effects account for state-level variance in union density where the effect is 
fixed over time.  However, Farber (2003) argues that there remain potential unobserved variables 
which simultaneously determine density and wages, but which are time-varying, and thus not 
picked up in fixed effects, which might bias our results.  
5.3. Occupations  
Finally, we moved on to estimate wage gaps at the level of the occupation.  Results are reported 
in Table 11 using the same samples used as we did above – pooling six years of data 1983-1988 
and 1996-2001 files from the Outgoing Rotation Group files of the CPS.  As we found with our 
estimates by industry there is considerable variation by occupation both in the first period and 
the second: the variation is greater than was found when the analysis was conducted at the level 
of states.  In the first period 11 occupations had wage gaps over 35% - primarily manual 
occupations.  In the second 7 of these occupations still had gaps of over 35%.    
Estimates by occupation    1983-8  1996-01            
<5%       10 10 
5-15%       9 9 
15-35%         14 17 
>=35%        11  8 
#  occupations     44  44   
 
Out of the 44 groups 13 showed increases in the size of the differential over time while the 
remainder had decreases.  We used the same method described above for industries and states, 
with occupations defined in a comparable way through time.   Columns (5) and (6) of Table 8 
show that, whether the occupation-level analysis is weighted or not, there is clear evidence of 
regression to the mean, with the lagged premium positive and significant, as well as evidence of 
a secular decline in the premium.  A significant counter-cyclical effect is evident when the 
regression is weighted, but not in the unweighted regression. 
In all three units of observation we have used – industry, state and occupation – there is 
evidence that the private sector premium moves counter-cyclically and that it has been declining 26 
over time.  In all three cases the lagged level of the premium entered significantly positively and 
was larger when the weights were used than when they were not.  The size of the lag was 
greatest when industries were used as the unit of observation and least when occupations were 
used.  Translating the results from levels into changes – that is by deducting t-1 from both sides – 
leaves all of the other coefficients unchanged.  Using the weighted results in Table 7 the results 
reported below imply mean convergence.   
State level             ∆Premium t - t-1     =   -.7949Premiumt-1 
Industry level        ∆Premium t - t-1    =     -.6457Premiumt-1 
Occupation level   ∆Premium t - t-1    =    -.8254Premiumt-1 
 
The higher the level of the premium in the previous period the lower the change in the next 
period. 
6.  What have we learned and would FM have been surprised about these results when they 
wrote WDUD? 
 
6.1.  The private sector wage premium is lower today than it was in the 1970s.   
This would not have surprised FM.  Indeed, they predicted that the premiums of the 1970s were 
unsustainable due to their impact on union density (FM 1984: 54). Perhaps it is surprising that 
the premium remains as high as it does?  One possibility is that, even though union bargaining 
power has declined, union density continues to decline, implying that there is some employment 
spillover into the non-union sector.  If wage setting in the non-union sector is more flexible than 
it used to be, this additional supply of labor to the non-union sector may depress non-union 
wages more so than in the past, keeping the premium higher than anticipated.   
6.2.  The union wage premium is counter-cyclical. 
The decline in the premium in good times is what seems to explain much of the decline in the 
premium since the mid-1990s.  Far from being a surprise to FM, they identified the counter-
cyclical nature of the premium.  We show the premium is counter-cyclical at the state, 
occupation and industry levels.  FM said COLA’s could dampen counter-cyclical movements in 27 
the premium, but thought their significance had been overplayed.  This is confirmed: we find no 
COLA effect, though this finding is contested by others. 
6.3.  There is evidence of a secular decline in the private sector union wage premium.  
There is evidence at state, industry and occupation level of a downward trend in the private 
sector union wage premium accompanying the marked decline in union presence in the private 
sector.  The effect is sensitive to weighting in the case of the state-level and industry-level 
premia, but not in the case of the occupational premia.  Interestingly the wage gap appears to 
have declined most in the smallest states (e.g. New Mexico, Alabama, Nebraska, Arkansas, 
South Dakota) and declined least in the bigger states (e.g. California, Texas, New York; Illinois).  
It would not have been a surprise to FM that there had been some reduction in the ability of 
unions over time to raise wages as the proportion of the workforce they bargain for has declined. 
6.4.  There remains big variation in the premium across workers. 
Patterns in the premium across worker types resemble those found by FM.  The FM sub-sample 
generally overstated the size of the premium in the population as a whole but we suspect this 
would not have surprised FM.  A decline in the premium over time seems to have occurred 
across all demographic characteristics in the private sector, but there is regression to the mean, 
the biggest losers being among the most vulnerable and certainly the lowest paid workers (the 
young, women, high school dropouts).  But perhaps the real surprise is just how large the 
premium still is for some of these workers (26% for high school dropouts, 19% for under 25s). 
One puzzle is the remarkable rise in the share of union employment taken by the highly 
qualified, yet they continue to receive the lowest union premium.  Why?  Do they look for 
something else from their unions, eg. professional indemnity insurance or voice, or are their 
unions less effective?  In contrast to the private sector, the public sector has experienced a small 
increase in the premium, an increase apparent for most public sector employees.  It is a sector 28 
where industry-level bargaining remains the norm, maintaining union bargaining power.  So, 
perhaps FM would not have been surprised by this result.  We look at one group of workers that 
FM did not consider: immigrants.  The premium varies little by year of entry to the US, but does 
depend on the country of birth, with Mexicans benefiting from the highest premium.  Whether 
this reflects the human capital, occupational mix, or costs of immigration faced by different 
groups is a matter for further research, but we suspect the results would not have surprised FM.   
6.5.  There is big variation in industry-level union wage premia. 
FM also found wide variation in industry-level premiums, and might have expected this to 
persist because unions’ ability to push for a premium, and employers’ ability to pay, is 
determined by industry-specific factors (such as union organization and the availability of non-
union labor, regulatory regimes, bargaining, product market rents).  However, we find 
convergence in industry-level premiums since FM wrote, that is, a falling premium where it was 
once large, and a rising premium where it was once small.  (Overall decline at the economy level 
is due to the fact that the former constitute a larger share of employment than the latter).  FM 
may well have been surprised by this regression to the mean because in 40% of the industries we 
examined there was a rise in the premium.   
6.6.  State level union wage premia vary less than occupation and  industry level premia. 
FM did not explicitly compare variations in the premia at the state and industry levels.  Richard 
Freeman expressed the view to us that it made sense to him that there would be more variation at 
the occupation and industry levels as they are more closely approximated to markets.  No 
surprise here. 
6.7.  Union workers remain better able than non-union workers to resist employer efforts to 
reduce wages when market conditions are unfavorable. 29 
Import penetration is a good proxy for competition in the traded goods sector.  Although the 
impact of imports on the US wage distribution is often overstated (Blanchflower, 2000a), it may 
be expected to play a role where imports permit substitution of union products for non-union 
products. If imports reduce demand for domestic output and, in turn, demand for labor, this 
should reduce union and non-union wages (assuming the supply of non-union labor is not 
perfectly elastic).  Whether the premium rises or falls with increased import penetration depends 
on the relative responsiveness of union and non-union wages to demand shifts resulting from 
foreign competition. Unions’ ability to resist employer efforts to reduce wages when market 
conditions are unfavorable was cited as one reason for the counter-cyclical premium by FM 
(1984: 52-53).   
6.8.  There has been a decline in the unadjusted wage gap relative to the regression-adjusted 
wage gap. 
Union members do have wage-enhancing advantages over non-members, but these have 
diminished in recent years, implying changes in the selection of employees into membership.  It 
is unlikely that FM would have predicted this. 
7.  The policy implications 
In spite of – or perhaps because of – the inexorable decline in union membership since FM 
wrote, and despite some evidence of a recent secular decline in the premium, the union wage 
premium in the US remains substantial, and is substantial by international standards 
(Blanchflower and Bryson, 2003).  How should US policy analysts treat this piece of 
information: should policy support unions or make life more difficult for them? 
From a standard economic perspective a substantial union premium has to be bad news: 
in bargaining on their members’ behalf unions distort market wage setting, resulting in a loss of 
economic efficiency.  This may have consequences for jobs and investment for the firms 30 
involved, and potential impacts for the economy as a whole in terms of inflation and output.  
However, it is not obvious that markets do operate in the textbook competitive fashion, so there 
may indeed be rents available that employers are at liberty to share with workers.  Furthermore, 
there is evidence – confirmed in this paper – that unions are particularly good at protecting the 
wages of the most vulnerable workers.  If the most vulnerable are receiving less than their 
marginal product – and, perhaps, even if they are receiving it – there may be moral and ethical 
grounds for supporting unions.  Finally, whether analysts like it or not there is substantial unmet 
demand for union representation in the US
33.  People aren’t getting what they want, raising the 
question of whether policy should be deployed to assist unions to organize. 
FM found the union premium effect on output was modest, and inflation effects were 
negligible.  There is no reason to alter this judgment.  However, the size of the social costs of 
unionization requires an answer to a fundamental, unanswered question, namely: where does the 
premium originate? FM assume that it necessarily originates in the monopoly rents of employers 
in privileged market positions, although there are at least three possibilities: 
1)  unions increase the size of the pie because unionized workers are more productive than like 
workers in a non-unionized environment, 
2)  unions operate in firms with excess profits arising from a privileged market position (this may 
arise either because unions only seek to organize where there are excess profits available, or 
because these sorts of employers have something particular to gain in contracting with unions), 
3)  the premium is simply a tax on normal profits. 
It really matters which of these three options it is.  If 1) is true then there’s no implication for 
workplace survival or union density, indeed, if this were the case, one might expect a growth in   
unionization as firms recognize the advantages in unionizing. If it’s 2) then there is limited 
damage, but with 3) there are real problems for firms, with potential knock-on effects for 31 
investment, jobs and prices.  Of course, different employers may be in different positions at any 
point in time and the weight attached to the three options may differ over time with the business 
cycle, structural change in the economy and so on.  What evidence is there on the above?  Barry 
Hirsch, in his chapter for this volume, covers these issues in some detail.  Here we focus on some 
key points. 
i) FM (1984: 54) speculate that, at least in some areas, the wage gap has ‘reached levels 
inconsistent with the survival of many union jobs’.  Blanchflower and Freeman (1992) take this 
issue further and argue that the levels of the union wage differential were so high this gave 
incentives to employers to remove the union – the benefits of removing the unions appeared to 
outweigh the costs. Well, what has happened to union jobs?  There is a growing body of 
evidence that employment growth rates are lower in the unionized sector, suggesting 2) and or 
3).  The evidence is for the U.S. (Leonard, 1992), Canada (Long, 1993), Australia (Wooden and 
Hawke, 2000) and Britain (Blanchflower, Millward and Oswald, 1991; Bryson, 2001). However,  
Freeman and Kleiner (1999) and DiNardo and Lee (2001) find no clear link between 
unionization and closure.  Indeed, FM record instances in which union workers accepted cuts in 
normal wages (‘givebacks’), sometimes to keep employers in business.     
ii) Unionization is more common where employers operate in monopolistic or oligopolistic 
product markets, suggesting that unions do try to extract surplus rents. 
iii) The premium falls when one accounts for workplace heterogeneity. The implication is that 
some of the premium usually attached to membership is, in fact, due to unionized workplaces 
paying higher wages than non-unionized workplaces.  If this is so, why?  Perhaps unions target 
organization efforts on workplaces that have rents to share, as noted above, they would be 
foolish not to.  Or employers use unions as agents to deliver lower quit rates to recoup 
investment in human capital (which makes them more productive/profitable).  Abowd, Kramarz 32 
and Margolis (1999) say higher paying firms are more profitable and/or more productive than 
other firms.  If this is so for unionized firms, they are operating at a higher level of performance 
than other firms.  It makes sense that unions are located in higher performing workplaces since, 
despite higher wages and a negative union effect on performance, they continue to survive, albeit 
with slower employment growth rates.  A central thesis of WDUD was that unions were more 
productive so this would not be a surprise to FM. 
iv)  The evidence that unions have a substantial negative impact on employment growth suggests 
that the social cost of unions may be larger than FM calculated.  If the premium reduces the 
competitiveness of unionized firms, they’ll lose employees and, as a consequence, union 
organizing will get tougher for unions.  This is exactly what has happened.  On the other hand, if 
unions do not command a premium, they lose their best selling point for prospective customers.   
It’s Catch 22. 
From a public policy perspective, it is not obvious from this evidence that unions, taken 
as a whole, operate to the detriment of the economy or, if they do, that the magnitude of the 
problem is really that great.  Even the evidence on slower employment growth rates is open to 
the criticism that the link is not causal but arises because unions are often located in declining 
sectors.  What is lacking from the discussion above is a realization that unions and their effects 
are heterogeneous: taking wages alone, they appear to operate very differently across individuals, 
states, and industries.  Before we can make any clear policy prescriptions about what 
governments should do to, or for, unions we need to know more about the nature of this 
heterogeneity to establish under what conditions employers and unions can increase the size of 
the pie. 
And then finally we asked Richard Freeman whether he was surprised by any of these 
findings.  He kindly read the paper and told us,  33 
1) he was most surprised by the fact that the public sector wage effects are so large and so 
similar to those in the private sector,   
2)  that we know little about the social costs of unions in the twenty first century.  Consequently 
he was unsure about the magnitude of the social costs, but would like to see empirical work on 
the issue although he said would be ‘stunned’ if there were large effects, but as any good 
empiricist he would let the data speak, 
3)  he was not surprised by any of our other findings.   
So there you have it! 34 
Table 1.  Disaggregated union membership rates, 1977 & 2001 
 
  1977  2001      
     
All 24  14   
Private sector  22  9   
Public sector  33  37 
 
Private sector employees 
Men                 27  12   
Women 11  6 
 
Whites 20  9 
Non-white 27  10 
 
Ages 16-24  12  4 
Ages 25-44  23  9 
Ages 45-54  27  13 
Ages >=55  22  10 
    
< high school  23  7 
High school  25  12 
> high school  13  8 
    
North East  24  12 
Central 25  12 
South 13  5 
West 22  9 
  
Agriculture, forestry &      
  Fisheries  3  2 
Mining 47  12 
Construction 36  19 
Manufacturing 34  15 
Transportation, communication,   
  And other public utilities  48  24 
Wholesale & retail trade  10  4 
FIRE 4  3 
Services 7  6 
 
 
Source: 1977 “What Do Unions Do’. 2001 own calculations from the ORG file of the CPS. 35 
Table 2.  Union Membership and Employment by Sector (‘000’s). 
 
 Union  membership   Total  employment 
a) 1983       
Private  sector  11,933  71,224        
 
Public sector  5,737  15,633 
Federal  Government  469  2,417   
Post  Office  523  705   
State  Government  1,071  3,800   
Local Government  3,673  8,711 
 
% union members in  32.5% 
 the public sector       
 
b) 2002 
Private sector  8,652    100,581 
 
Public sector  7,327  19,379 
Federal  Government  443  2,382    
Post  Office  615  874    
State  Government  1,756  5,654    
Local Government  4,514  10,488 
 
% union members in  45.9% 
 the public sector       
 
Source: Based on data from Table 1c of Union Membership and Earnings Data Book: 
Compilations from the CPS by B.T. Hirsch and D.T. Macpherson, 2003. 36 
Table 3.  Private sector union/non-union log hourly wage differentials, 1974-1979 & 1996-2001  
                                                 Private sector                           Freeman/Medoff’s sample 
                                        1974-1979              1996-2001       1974-1979              1996-2001      
Men                 19%  17%          27%  28%   
Women 22%  13%  27%  24%   
 
Ages 16-24  32%  19%  35%  23%   
Ages 25-44  17%  16%  26%  28%   
Ages 45-54  13%  14%  22%  27%   
Ages >=55  19%  16%  29%  28%   
  
Northeast 14%  11%  21%  22%   
Central 20%  15%  27%  27%   
South 24%  19%  29%  26%   
West 23%  22%  31%  34%   
 
< High school  33%  26%  31%  29%   
High school  19%  21%  25%  28%   
College 1-3 years  17%  15%  28%  28%   
College >=4 years  4%  3%  17%  14%   
 
Whites 21%  16%  28%  27%   
Non-white 22%  19%  28%  30%   
 
Tenure 0-3 years  20%  20%  28%  n/a   
Tenure 4-10  16%  15%  19%  n/a   
Tenure 11-15  10%  11%  12%  n/a   
Tenure 16+  17%  8%  28%  n/a   
 
Manual 30%  21%  n/a  n/a   
Non-manual 15%  4%  n/a  n/a   
 
Manufacturing 16%  10%  19%  19%   
Construction 49%  39%  55%  45%   
Services (excl construc.)  34%  16%  43%  29%   
Private sector  21%  17%  28%  28%   
 
Notes: 1996-2001 data files exclude individuals with imputed hourly earnings.  Controls for 1996-2001 are 50 state 
dummies, 46 industry dummies, gender, 15 highest qualification dummies, private non-profit dummy, age, age 
squared, log of weekly hours, 4 race dummies, 4 marital status, year dummies + union membership dummy 
(n=546,823).  Estimates for 1974-1979 are adjusted upwards by the average bias found during 1979-81 of .033. 
Controls for 1974-1979 are 9 census division dummies, 46 industry dummies, years of education, age, age squared, 
log of weekly hours, 4 race dummies, 4 marital status dummies, 5 year dummies + union membership dummy 
(n=183,881).  Tenure estimates for 1974-1979 obtained from the May 1979 CPS and for 1996-2002 files and 
February 1996 and 1998 Displaced Worker and Employee Tenure Supplements and January 2002 and February 
2000: Displaced Workers, Employee Tenure, and Occupational Mobility Supplements.  Freeman/Medoff’s sample 
consists of non-agricultural private sector blue-collar workers aged 20-65 (n=64,034 for 1974-1979 and 142,024 for 
1996-2001).  37 
Table 4.  Union wage differentials in the public sector 
                              1983-1988      1996-2001 
         Wage gap    Sample                Wage gap   Sample  
                                         Size                                         Size    
Private  22% (754,056)  17% (567,627)   
Public  13% (165,276)  15% (110,833) 
Federal   2%  (33,633)  8%     (20,938) 
State    9% (42,942)  10% (34,919) 
Local    16% (88,642)  20% (60,981) 
 
Male  8% (77,528)  10% (48,298)   
Female  17% (87,748)  16% (62,534)   
 
Age <25  28%  (15,603)  23%  (7,771)   
Age  25-44  13% (93,676)  15% (53,798)   
Age  45-54  8% (32,127)  11% (33,830)   
Age  >=55  13% (23,870)  14% (15,433)   
        
New  England  17% (33,540)  17% (20,148)   
Central  16% (38,863)  16% (25,930)   
South  10% (51,785)  12% (33,522)   
West  10% (41,088)  13% (31,232)   
      
<High  school  26% (13,217)  18% (29,775)   
High  school  15% (48,037)  13% (21,536)   
College 1-3  13%  (35,097)  11%  (9,672)   
College >= 4 years  8%  (68,925)  11%  (50,029)   
      
Whites 13%  (131,676)  14%  (85,893)   
Non-whites  15% (33,600)  16% (24,939)   
      
Manual 18%  (17,874)  18%  (9,679)   
Non-manual  13% (147,402)  14% (101,150)   
 
Registered nurses (95)   5%  (2,945)  6%  (1,854) 
Teachers (156-8)  15%  (25,147)  21%  (19,484)   
Social workers (174)  12%  (2,870)  12%  (2,716) 
Lawyers (178)  5%  (1,014)  17%  (1,184) 
Firefighters (416-7)  15% (1,866)  19%  (1,227) 
Police, sheriffs, bailiffs& correction  16%  (6,068)  18%  (5,503) 
  officers  (418-424) 
 
Sample excludes individuals with allocated earnings.  Controls as in Table 3. Source: Outgoing 
Rotation Group files of the CPS.  Numbers in parentheses towards the bottom of the first column 
are 1980 Occupational Classification codes 38 
 Table 5. Union Wage Gap Estimates for the United States, 1973-2002 (%)(excludes workers 
with imputed earnings) 
 
                              All sectors                          Private sector                        Private sector 
Year                        Blanchflower/Bryson            Blanchflower/Bryson      Hirsch/Schumacher 
1973  14.1% 12.7% 17.5% 
1974  14.6% 13.8% 17.5% 
1975  15.1% 14.3% 19.2% 
1976  15.5% 14.6% 20.4% 
1977  19.0% 18.3% 23.9% 
1978  18.8% 18.6% 22.8% 
1979  16.6% 16.3% 19.7% 
1980  17.7% 17.0% 21.3% 
1981  16.1% 16.3% 20.4% 
1983  19.5% 21.2% 25.5% 
1984  20.4% 22.4% 26.2% 
1985  19.2% 21.0% 26.0% 
1986  18.8% 20.1% 23.9% 
1987  18.5% 20.0% 24.0% 
1988  18.4% 19.1% 22.6% 
1989  17.8% 19.2% 24.5% 
1990  17.1% 17.6% 22.5% 
1991  16.1% 16.6% 22.0% 
1992  17.9% 19.2% 22.5% 
1993  18.5% 19.6% 23.5% 
1994  18.5% 18.2% 25.2% 
1995  17.4% 18.0% 24.5% 
1996  17.4% 18.4% 23.5% 
1997  17.4% 17.7% 23.2% 
1998  15.8% 16.1% 22.4% 
1999  16.0% 16.9% 22.0% 
2000 13.4%  14.3%   20.4% 
2001  14.1% 15.1% 20.0% 
2002 16.5%  18.6%   
1973-2001  average  17.1% 17.6% 22.4% 
 
Notes: Wage gap estimates calculated taking anti-logs and deducting 1. Columns 1 and 2 are taken from Table 3 of 
Blanchflower and Bryson (2003). Column 3 is taken from column 5 of Table 4 of Hirsch and Schumacher (2002).   
Data for 1973-81 are from the May CPS Earnings Supplements. a) 1973-1981 May CPS, n=38,000 for all sectors, 
and n=31,000 for the private sector. Controls comprise age, age
2, male, union, years of education, 2 race dummies, 
28 state dummies, usual hours, private sector and 50 industry dummies. For 1980 and 1981 sample sizes fall to 
approx. 16,000 because from 1980 only respondents in months 4 and 8 in the outgoing rotation groups report a 
wage. Since the May CPS sample files available to us do not include allocated earnings in 1979-81, the series in 
columns 2 and 4 are adjusted upward by the average bias of 0.033 found by Hirsch and Schumacher (2002) using 
these May CPS data for 1979-81.  The data for 1973-1978 do not include individuals with allocated earnings and 
hence no adjustment is made in those years.  b) Data for 1983-2002 are taken from the MORG files of the CPS.   
Controls comprise usual hours, age, age
2, four race dummies, 15 highest qualifications dummies, male, union, 46 
industry dummies, four organizational status dummies, and 50 state dummies. Sample is employed private sector 
nonagricultural wage and salary workers aged 16 years and above with positive weekly earnings and non-missing 39 
data for control variables (few observations are lost). All allocated earners were identified and excluded for the years 
1983-88 and 1996-2001 from the MORG files. For 1989-95, allocation flags are either unreliable (in 1989-93) or not 
available (1994 through August 1995).  For 1989-93, the gaps are adjusted upward by the average imputation bias 
during 1983-88.  For 1994-95, the gap is adjusted upward by the bias during 1996-98. In each year there are 
approximately 160,000 observations for the US economy and 130,000 for the private sector in the MORG; in the 
May files, sample sizes are approximately 38,000 and 31,000 respectively until 1980 and 1981 when sample sizes 
fall to approximately 16,000 and 13,000, respectively, as from that date on only respondents in months four and 
eight in the outgoing rotation groups report a wage.   
 
The Hirsch and Schumacher (2002) wage gap reported in column 3 is the coefficient on a dummy variable for union 
membership in a regression where the log of hourly earnings is the dependent variable. The control variables 
included are years of schooling, experience and its square (allowed to vary by gender), and dummy variables for 
gender, race and ethnicity (3), marital status (2), part-time status, region (8), large metropolitan area, industry (8), 




Table 6. The Ratio between Unadjusted and Adjusted Union Wage Gap Estimates for the United 
States, 1983-2002 (%) - Excludes Workers with Imputed earnings. 
 
                              Unadjusted                  Adjusted              Unadjusted/adjusted 
1983 48.3%  21.2%  2.28 
1984 48.3%  22.4%  2.16 
1985 47.0%  21.0%  2.24 
1986 44.8%  20.1%  2.23 
1987 45.2%  20.0%  2.26 
1988 44.6%  19.1%  2.34 
1989 38.0%  19.2%  1.98 
1990 34.3%  17.6%  1.95 
1991 32.8%  16.6%  1.98 
1992 32.5%  19.2%  1.69 
1993 34.0%  19.6%  1.74 
1995 34.6%  18.0%  1.92 
1996 35.8%  18.4%  1.95 
1997 36.1%  17.7%  2.04 
1998 33.2%  16.1%  2.07 
1999 32.5%  16.9%  1.92 
2000 29.4%  14.3%  2.06 
2001 29.8%  15.1%  1.98 
2002 35.6%  18.6%  1.91 
 
Notes: column 1 obtained from a series of private sector log hourly wage equations that only 
contained a union membership dummy and a constant.  Reported here is the antilog of the 
coefficient minus 1.  Column 2 is from Table 5.  Column 3 is column 1/column 2. 
 
Sample is employed private sector nonagricultural wage and salary workers aged 16 years and 
above with positive weekly earnings and non-missing data for control variables (few 
observations are lost) 
 
Source:  ORG files of the CPS, 1983-2001. 41 
Table 7.  Wage gap estimates by private sector industry 
 
                                                              1983-1988                                                       1996-2001                        
                                                        density           wage gap        N                   density      wage gap        N          ∆density    ∆wage gap 
Agricultural services   1.8%  41.2% 1,852    2.2%  32.6% 4,115  0.4%  -8.6% 
Other agriculture   2.5%  55.9%  12,451   1.8%  23.0%  4,828  -0.7%  -32.9% 
Mining    18.3%  15.8% 9,311    12.8%  9.4% 4,142  -5.5%  -6.4% 
Construction   22.7%  51.6%  44,026   18.8%  40.9%  31,878  -3.9%  -10.7% 
Lumber   15.1%  15.7%  6,662   9.9%  14.0%  4,251  -5.2%  -1.7% 
Furniture    16.8%  11.3% 5,449    7.8%  2.7% 3,288  -9.0%  -8.6% 
Stone, clay & glass   30.6%  14.5% 5,143    21.6%  12.6% 3,149  -9.0%  -1.9% 
Primary  metals    48.1%  5.8% 7,021    36.0%  8.0% 3,852  -12.1%  2.2% 
Fabricated metals   28.1%  12.5% 11,117    16.5%  13.7%  7,033  -11.6%  1.2% 
Machinery excluding electrical   17.5%  3.9% 22,343    11.0%  8.2% 13,061  -6.5%  4.3% 
Electrical equipment   19.6%  6.4%  19,162   10.6%  10.1%  10,387  -9.0%  3.7% 
Autos   56.6%  10.0%  10,365   38.8%  21.7%  6,749  -17.8%  11.7% 
Aircraft    34.6%  0.4% 4,929    27.8%  5.7% 2,347  -6.8%  5.3% 
Other transport equipment   23.9%  4.8%  5,517   16.3%  9.2%  2,933  -7.6%  4.4% 
Photographic   10.0%  -0.9%  6,104   5.1%  -3.1%  4,069  -4.9%  -2.2% 
Toys   16.3%  2.2%  1,094   6.4%  1.5%  828  -9.9%  -0.7% 
Miscellaneous manufacturing   13.8%  7.6% 3,344    8.4%  22.0% 2,416  -5.4%  14.4% 
Food   31.1%  16.9%  16,396   22.5%  13.0%  9,627  -8.6%  -3.9% 
Tobacco    33.0%  26.0% 553    22.4%  17.4% 248  -10.6% -8.6% 
Textiles   10.0%  4.0%  7,076   5.6%  -1.4%  2,681  -4.4%  -5.4% 
Apparel    20.8%  5.1%  10,666    8.1% 2.7%  4,144 -12.7%  -2.4% 
Paper    44.6%  7.6% 6,544    29.9%  9.7% 3,479  -14.7%  2.1% 
Printing   13.4%  24.4%  14,983   8.2%  18.3%  9,331  -5.2%  -6.1% 
Chemicals   17.2%  0.8%  10,953   11.0%  4.7%  6,908  -6.2%  3.9% 
Petroleum   32.7%  2.3%  1,678   21.9%  -0.1%  940  -10.8%  -2.4% 
Rubber & plastics   23.3%  11.4%  6,732   15.2%  9.2%  4,716  -8.1%  -2.2% 
Leather & nes   20.7%  1.4%  1,953   17.5%  20.4%  633  -3.2%  19.0% 
Transport    35.8%  44.2% 29,626    25.9%  36.2% 22,091  -9.9%  -8.0% 
Communications   39.4%  6.0%  14,075   22.3%  10.2%  9,884  -17.1%  4.2% 42 
Utilities & sanitary   35.1%  5.4% 9,731    29.6%  15.0% 6,085  -5.5%  9.6% 
Wholesale trade   8.1%  15.7%  35,107   5.7%  9.3%  24,987  -2.4%  -6.4% 
Retail trade   7.3%  34.2%  155,875   5.1%  13.9%  110,741  -2.2%  -20.3% 
Banking   1.6%  1.4%  28,151   2.0%  -3.2%  20,459  0.4%  -4.6% 
Insurance & real estate   3.6%  4.8% 28,075    2.9%  6.5% 20,034  -0.7%  1.7% 
Private households   0.3%  29.2% 10,567    1.0%  0.2%  3,723  0.7%  -29.0% 
Business services   5.1%  15.3%  31,916   3.0%  6.9%  30,867  -2.1%  -8.4% 
Repair services   5.8%  36.6%  8,259   3.3%  37.0%  6,504  -2.5%  0.4% 
Personal services excl households  8.4%  11.1% 22,431  6.8%  12.1% 15,731  -1.6%  1.0% 
Entertainment   11.7%  46.8%  8,863   6.8%  29.3%  9,949  -4.9%  -17.5% 
Hospitals    11.8%  7.4% 32,573    8.1%  10.2% 25,514  -3.7%  2.8% 
Health excl hosp   5.1%  5.4%  28,681   4.6%  3.0%  31,345  -0.5%  -2.4% 
Educational    9.7%  21.2% 16,421    12.8%  18.6% 15,522  3.1%  -2.6% 
Social services   3.0%  24.0%  10,338   2.9%  16.6%  13,478  -0.1%  -7.4% 
Other  professional    3.5%  29.3% 28,175  2.4%  15.0% 27,600  -1.1%  -14.3%   
 
Notes: see Tables 3 and 5.  Union estimates are obtained from the ORG data files (weighted). 43 
Table 8.  Industry, state and occupation level analysis of the private sector union wage premium, 1984-2001 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   
Level of analysis  Industry   Industry        State         State     Occupation   Occupation 
Premiumt-1                                                           .2584* .3453* .2051* .2366* .0907* .1746* 
  (.0367) (.0350) (.0337) (.0333) (.0379) (.0374) 
Unemployment ratet-1  .6333  .5866* .4373* .5366* .3799  .5823* 
  (.4035) (.2821) (.1449) (.1175) (.5084) (.2900) 
Time  -.0463 -.2344*-.1547*  -.0651 -.3419*  -.2416* 
  (.1056) (.0762) (.0468) (.0379) (.1343) (.0788) 
 
State/industry/occupation dummies  50 50 41 41 41 41   
Weighted by # obs at 1
st  stage  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes   
 
R
2  .6187 .7749 .5071 .5861 .7345 .8453 
N  756 756 918 918 756 756 
 
Source: Outgoing Rotation Groups of the CPS, 1984-2001.  Samples exclude individuals with imputed earnings.  44 
Table 9.  Industry level analysis of the level of the union wage premium in the private sector 1973-1999. 
  (1)  (2)                  (3)                (4)  (5)                 (6)                 (7)                   (8)   (9) 
Premiumt-1      .6030*  .2759* .6001* .2468* .3196* 
          (.0274) (.0350) (.0284) (.0361) (.0333) 
Time      -.0019*  -.0012* .0002 -.0011* -.0001  -.0009* 
        (.0004) (.0003) (.0004) (.0003) (.0004) (.0003) 
Unemployment  rate  .0187* .0131* .0108* .0083* .0064* .0064* .0061* .0070* .0052* 
  (.0017) (.0017) (.0011) (.0014) (.0010) (.0021) (.0011) (.0022) (.0010) 
COLA  .0763* .0767* .0403* .0155 -.0065  .0139 .0041 .0156 .0141* 
  (.0313) (.0303) (.0126) (.0134) (.0090) (.0140) (.0108) (.0144) (.0096) 
Inflation -.0182*  -.0077 .0012 .0006 .0024*  .0026 .0020*  .0032 .0002 
  (.0065) (.0069) (.0008) (.0008) (.0007) (.0015) (.0008) (.0016) (.0008) 
Unemployment rate*COLA  -.0092*  -.0047   
 (.0038)  (.0036)   
Unemployment rate*Inflation  .0026*  .0012     
   (.0009)  (.0009)   
Import penetration  .2048*  .2201* .2362* .3090* .1688* .1234* .1738* .1668* .1811* 
    Durables  (.0427) (.0414) (.0441) (.0424) (.0326) (.0416) (.0461) (.0549) (.0302) 
Import penetration  .1655*  .1459* .1491* .1698* .0939* .0880* .0914* .0945* .1043* 
    Non-durables  (.0513) (.0525) (.0509) (.0488) (.0302) (.0208) (.0419) (.0265) (.0314) 
Deregulation  Communications  .0752* .0609* .0589* .0612* .0451* .0625* .0506* .0734* .0532* 
  (.0316) (.0244) (.0246) (.0248) (.0200) (.0307) (.0234) (.0261) (.0193) 
Deregulation  Rail  .0329 .0400 .0394 .0580 .0200         .0333 
  (.0905) (.0844) (.0855) (.0839) (.0616)          (.0606) 
Deregulation Trucking  -.0716  -.0617  -.0630 -.0394 -.0139          -.0332 
  (.0560) (.0570) (.0565) (.0518) (.0429)          (.0398) 
Deregulation  Air  .0554 .0684 .0661 .0815 .0087         .0214 
  (.1262) (.1217) (.1190) (.1161) (.0852)        (.0804) 
Deregulation Finance  -.0614*  -.0599* -.0587* -.0329  .0179        -.0174 
  (.0191) (.0188) (.0195) (.0203) (.0160)        (.0150) 
Weighted  .Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes  No  Yes 
Method  GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS OLS  OLS  GLS 
 
Wald Chi
2  2325.01  2781.32 2686.37 3190.74 10961.71  1220.21    6189.4 
R
2            .8973  .6516 
N  832  832 832 832  832  832  832  832 806 
 
All equations also include a full set of 31 industry dummies.  Data are taken from Bratsberg and Ragan 2002. GLS regression estimated with industry specific 
AR(1) process in error term.  Where indicated ach observation in the GLS regressions is weighted by the industry observation count of the first step following 
Berntsberg and Ragan (2002).  Column 9 excludes Retail Trade.  Standard errors in parentheses.45 
Table 10.  Wage gaps and union density by state 
 
  1983 - 1988      1996 - 2001    
State  Density  N               Wage gap   Density  N  Wage gap    Change in     Change in   
 (1983)      (2000)      density  wage  gap 
Alabama*   16.9%  8,908  27.3%          9.6%  7,463  13.1%  -7.3%  -14.2% 
Alaska  24.9% 9,407 22.9%  21.9% 5,280 15.5% -3.0% -7.4% 
Arizona*  11.4% 8,291 32.3%  6.4% 8,858 21.7% -5.0%  -10.7% 
Arkansas* 11.0% 9,037 31.3%  5.8% 7,317 16.1% -5.2%  -15.2% 
California  21.9% 59,161  23.5%  16.0% 44,410  22.1%  -5.9%  -1.4% 
Colorado  13.6%  10,384 26.4%  9.0% 9,923 13.5% -4.6%  -12.8% 
Connecticut  22.7% 9,671 12.2%  16.3% 6,249  8.3% -6.4% -3.9% 
Delaware  20.1% 8,451 22.9%  13.3% 5,759 14.1% -6.8% -8.8% 
Dist of Columbia  19.5%  5,758  17.8%  14.7%  4,211  11.1%  -4.8%  -6.8% 
Florida*  10.2% 30,682  26.9%  6.8% 24,244  16.8%  -3.4% -10.1% 
Georgia*  11.9%  11,547 21.9%  6.3% 8,904 20.7% -5.6% -1.2% 
Hawaii  29.2% 7,634 18.8%  24.8% 5,202 20.8% -4.4%  2.0% 
Idaho*  12.5% 9,042 31.0%  7.6% 8,143 26.6% -4.9% -4.4% 
Illinois  24.2% 30,071  18.5%  18.6% 23,510  14.0%  -5.6%  -4.5% 
Indiana  24.9%  13,139 22.0% 15.6% 8,554 17.6% -9.3% -4.4% 
Iowa*  17.2% 9,874 24.9%  13.6% 8,474 20.0% -3.6% -4.9% 
Kansas*  13.7% 9,456 25.4%  9.0% 8,254 18.6% -4.7% -6.7% 
Kentucky  17.9% 8,884 22.9%  12.0% 6,545 18.9% -5.9% -4.0% 
Louisiana* 13.8% 7,867 24.9%  7.1% 5,922 20.9% -6.7% -3.9% 
Maine  21.0% 8,730  7.0%  14.0% 6,662 16.1% -7.0%  9.0% 
Maryland  18.5%  11,169 22.6% 14.6% 6,322 10.8% -3.9%  -11.8% 
Massachusetts  23.7% 28,695  12.0%  14.3% 11,895  13.5%  -9.4%  1.6% 
Michigan  30.4% 29,789  16.9%  20.8% 20,047  12.7%  -9.6%  -4.1% 
Minnesota  23.2% 12,061  26.5%  18.2% 10,194  16.5%  -5.0% -10.0% 
Mississippi*  9.9% 8,941 25.0%  6.0% 5,909 14.3% -3.9%  -10.6% 
Missouri  20.8%  11,983 31.3% 13.2% 7,386 21.9% -7.6% -9.4% 
Montana  18.3% 8,605 31.1%  13.9% 7,444 21.7% -4.4% -9.5% 
Nebraska* 13.6% 9,523 37.3%  8.4% 9,067 22.3% -5.2%  -15.0% 46 
Nevada*  22.4% 8,446 25.9%  17.1% 8,555 18.5% -5.3% -7.3% 
New  Hampshire  11.5% 8,228 21.4%  10.4% 6,901 19.6% -1.1% -1.8% 
New  Jersey  26.9% 29,018  9.0%  20.8% 15,060  7.9%  -6.1%  -1.1% 
New  Mexico  11.8% 7,345 34.6%  8.1% 6,909 20.4% -3.7%  -14.1% 
New  York  32.5% 44,351  11.7%  25.5% 27,394  11.2%  -7.0%  -0.6% 
North  Carolina*  7.6% 27,599  27.8%  3.6% 13,458  25.7%  -4.0%  -2.0% 
North  Dakota*  13.2% 8,915 35.0%  6.5% 7,817 28.0% -6.7% -7.0% 
Ohio  25.1% 33,118  17.7%  17.3% 21,484  11.6%  -7.8%  -6.1% 
Oklahoma*  11.5% 9,339 23.5%  6.8% 7,614 23.4% -4.7% -0.1% 
Oregon  22.3% 8,243 20.3%  16.1% 7,371 17.5% -6.2% -2.9% 
Pennsylvania  27.5% 32,228  15.6%  16.9% 23,276  10.8% -10.6%  -4.8% 
Rhode  Island  21.5% 8,325 15.8%  18.2% 6,117 11.3% -3.3% -4.5% 
South  Carolina*  5.9% 9,960 23.9%  4.0% 6,195 13.3% -1.9%  -10.5% 
South  Dakota*  11.5% 9,981 28.9%  5.5% 8,351 12.1% -6.0%  -16.8% 
Tennessee*  15.1% 9,922 25.9%  8.9% 6,883 14.2% -6.2%  -11.6% 
Texas*  9.7% 37,316  25.7%  5.8% 27,668  19.0%  -3.9%  -6.7% 
Utah*  15.2% 9,308 29.3%  7.3% 8,741 18.6% -7.9%  -10.7% 
Vermont  12.6% 7,968  7.0%  10.3% 6,330  8.4% -2.3%  1.4% 
Virginia*  11.7%  12,777 28.5%  5.6% 8,587 24.0% -6.1% -4.5% 
Washington  27.1% 8,685 22.6%  18.2% 7,947 14.3% -8.9% -8.3% 
West  Virginia  25.3% 7,257 27.1%  14.3% 6,633 21.3%  -11.0% -5.8% 
Wisconsin  23.8% 12,288  20.2%  17.6% 10,188  12.9%  -6.2%  -7.3% 
Wyoming* 13.9% 6,259 32.0%  8.3% 7,336 33.1% -5.6%  1.1% 
  
Source: Outgoing Rotation Group files of the CPS.  Union density obtained from Statistical Abstract of the United States 2001, Table 
639.  Notes: * implies right-to-work state. 
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Table 11.  Private sector union density and wage gaps by occupation, 1983-2001. 
 
                                1983-1989                    1996-01     
                                                                                          Union     Wage      N         Union        Wage        N        ∆ density  ∆Wage 
                                                                                          density     gap                          density        gap           gap 
Other Executive, Administrators & Managers              3.1%   6.3%   51,252  2.3%        5.7%  54,524  -0.8%  -0.6% 
Management Related Occupations                                    3.1%  3.1%  21,736  2.3%  4.5%  19,742  -0.8%  1.4% 
Engineers   5.9%  -3.7%  12,231  3.9%  -1.7%  9,637  -2.0%  2.0% 
Mathematical & Computer Scientists  3.1%  -12.5%  4,154  1.8%  -7.6%  8,004  -1.3%  4.9% 
Natural Scientists   4.1%  4.3%  2,076   2.7%  11.4%  2,077  -1.4%  7.1% 
Health Diagnosing Occupations   3.3% 6.3%  1,731  3.9% -8.3% 2,422  0.6% -14.6% 
Health Assessment & Treating Occupations    11.1%  3.8%  15,157  11.1%   10.4% 14,388  0.0%  6.6% 
Teachers, College & University   8.8%  10.7%  2,013  8.3%  5.5%  2,155  -0.5%  -5.2% 
Teachers, Except College and University   10.0%  38.5%  7,399  12.2%   35.7%  8,528  2.2%  -2.8% 
Lawyers   1.7%  -1.9%  2,231  2.0%  -11.0%  2,293  0.3%  -9.1% 
Other Professional Specialty Occupations    6.3% 28.1%  18,832  4.9%   27.8% 16,683  -1.4%  -0.3% 
Health Technologists & Technicians    7.8% 4.6%  9,263  7.4%  3.8% 8,775 -0.4%  -0.8% 
Engineering and Science Technicians   12.3% 7.9%  8,328  9.5%    15.6% 5,914 -2.8%  7.7% 
Technicians, Except Health Engineering & Science  9.5%  16.2%  7,465  8.1%   25.1%  5,903  -1.4%  8.9% 
Supervisors – Administrative Support 5.8%  21.9%  19,664  3.7%  8.0%  19,200  -2.1%  -13.9% 
Sales Representatives, Finance & Business Service     3.2%  12.9%  12,624  2.7%  5.0%  9,948  -0.5%  -7.9% 
Sales Representatives, Commodities Except Retail   2.0%  4.8%  11,450  1.8%   -9.5%  7,315  -0.2%  -14.3% 
Sales Workers, Retail & Personal Services    7.5% 36.6%  51,351  4.6%   17.1% 34,567  -2.9%  -19.5% 
Sales Related Occupations   4.6%  50.2%  385        3.5%   26.4%  417  -1.1%  -23.8% 
Supervisors-Administrative Support   5.1%  -2.9%  4,550   4.3%  2.6%  2,873  -0.8%  5.5% 
Computer Equipment Operators   8.6%  10.7%  5,986  6.4%    10.2% 1,586 -2.2%  -0.5% 
Secretaries, Stenographers & Typists   3.9%  14.1%  34,703  3.3%   12.7%  14,449  -0.6%  -1.4% 
Financial Records, Processing Occupations    4.7% 20.1%  19,406  3.4%   17.6% 10,300  -1.3%  -2.5% 
Mail and Message Distributing   12.3%  40.9%  2,605  7.6%    33.1% 1,516 -4.7%  -7.8% 
Other Administrative Support Occupations  11.8% 19.7%  57,618  7.1%   18.1% 48,916  -4.7%  -1.6% 
Private Household Service Occupations   0.2%  9.3%  8,368  0.8%  1.8%  3,259  0.6%  -7.5% 
Protective Service Occupations  12.9%  23.1%  5,672  7.7%    20.7% 3,856 -5.2%  -2.4% 
Food Service Occupations   4.6%  21.0%  47,173   3.7%   16.5%  31,218  -0.9%  -4.5% 48 
Health Service Occupations   9.7%  8.1%  14,636  9.0%  8.8%  11,894  -0.7%  0.7% 
Cleaning & Building Service Occupations   15.9%  30.9%  20,720  11.3%  26.9%  13,646  -4.6%  -4.0% 
Personal Service Occupations   8.7%  35.8%  10,623  7.9%  36.6% 9,117 -0.8%  0.8% 
Mechanics & Repairers   28.9%  20.3% 33,537    20.5%  21.8%  21,893  -8.4%  1.5% 
Construction Trades   30.6%  48.6% 31,417  24.6%  41.1%  21,594  -6.0%  -7.5% 
Other Precision Production Occupations   24.9%  14.1%  34,107  18.0%  16.9%  20,229  -6.9%  2.8% 
Machine Operators & Tenders, Except Precision    32.1% 26.4%  49,011  20.9%  25.5% 25,357 -11.2%  -0.9% 
Fabricators, Assemblers & Inspectors & Samplers  35.8% 27.5%    24,007  21.3%  29.8% 14,662 -14.5%  2.3% 
Motor Vehicle Operators   26.0%  45.4%  24,638  18.3%  41.6%  17,115  -7.7%  -3.8% 
Other Transportation Occupations & Material Moving  47.3%  33.6%   10,539  33.3%  33.5%  6,293  -14.0%  -0.1% 
Construction Laborer   24.0%  59.5%  5,103  18.1%  53.7% 3,571 -5.9%  -5.8% 
Freight, Stock & Material Handlers  29.0%  37.2%  14,893  20.2%  24.2%  10,383  -8.8%  -13.0% 
Other Handlers, Equipment Cleaners & Laborers   23.3%  47.8%  19,305   14.2%  36.6%  11,519  -9.1%  -11.2% 
Farm Operators & Managers   1.8% 31.3%  649  0.9%  56.2%  444  -0.9%  24.9% 
Farm Workers & Related Occupations   3.1%  53.0%  14,047     2.9%  39.4%  8,194  -0.2%  -13.6% 
Forestry & Fishing Occupations                                    7.7%    20.3%  846  8.0%  -6.9%  349  0.3%  -27.2% 
  
Notes: individuals with allocated earnings excluded.  Private sector.  Controls are age, age squared, male 15 schooling dummies, 4 
race dummies, log of hours, 46 industry dummies, 50 state dummies and five year dummies.  Union density estimates for the private 
sector weighted and averaged over the two six year periods. 49 
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1 The symposium included an introduction by the editor John Burton along with reviews by Orley Ashenfelter, 
Barry Hirsch, David Lipsky, Dan Mitchell and Mel Reder plus a reply by Richard Freeman and Jim Medoff. 
 
2  It has been cited an astonishing 1024 times over its near twenty year life (is it really that long?).  In 2002 alone it 
had 34 cites.   It is clear that the book continues to be relevant. 
 
3 Richard Freeman has devoted a lot of his subsequent writings to an examination of unionism in the public sector 
including Freeman (1986, 1988), four chapters written with co-authors in Freeman and Ichniowski (1988), and a co-
authored  paper  on union wage gaps for police (Freeman, Ichniowski and Lauer, 1989).  Freeman’s other post-FM 
work on union wage effects includes an international comparative paper with one of the authors (Blanchflower and 
Freeman, 1992), and the impact of union decline on rising wage inequality in the United States – see for example 
Freeman, (1993, 1995, 1999); Freeman and Katz (1995); Freeman and Needels (1993) and Freeman and Revenga 
(1998). For a discussion of the issues involved see Blanchflower (2000a). 
 
4 For further discussions on these issues see Lewis (1986), Freeman (1984) and Blanchflower and Bryson (2003). 
 
5 In contrast Lewis (1986), who did not restrict his analysis to non-agricultural private sector blue-collar workers 
aged 20-65 as FM did, found no differences by either gender or color although he confirmed FM’s other 
disaggregated results.  Lewis reported a number of additional disaggregated results that were not examined by FM.  
Lewis found the wage gap was greater for married workers; U-shaped in age/experience; U-shaped in 
tenure/seniority minimizing at 22-24 years of seniority; was higher the higher is the unemployment rate.  He found 
mixed results regarding any relationship with the industry concentration ratio. 
 
6 Sample sizes in many cases were likely very small as is made clear from their footnote 11 which says that they 
limited their sample of industries to ones containing at least five union and non-union members.  The rule resulted in 
only four industries being dropped. 
 
7 FM use 1977 union density rates in table 2.1. 
 
8  These estimates are obtained from the ORG files.  Although numbers for the public and private sectors as a whole 
are available since 1973, the breakdown by federal, state and local employee only begins in 1983. 
 
9  We do not deal here with a further problem identified by Card (1996) of misclassification of self-reported union 
status in the CPS, first identified by Mellow and Sider (1983).  Card concludes that about 2.7% are false positives 
and 2.7% are false negatives.  Given that there are more non-union workers than union workers, this means the 
union density rate is biased upwards.  See Farber (2001) for a discussion and a procedure to adjust the union density 
rate for error.  In 1998, the observed private sector rate of 9.7% translates to an adjusted rate of 7.4% (the figures for 
1973 were 25.9% and 24.5% respectively).   
 
10  The number of wage observations followed by the percentage imputed in parentheses (hourly + non-hourly paid) 
in the NBER MORG are given below.  Note in 1995 allocation information is only available on one-third of the 
wage observations, hence the small sample. 
 
1979  171,745 (16.5%)      1986  179,147 (10.7%)     1993  174,595 (4.6%)   2000  161,126 (29.8%) 
1980  199,469 (15.8%)     1987  180,434 (13.5%)     1994  170,865 (0%)   2001  171,533 (30.9%) 
1981  186,923 (15.2%)     1988  173,118 (14.4%)     1995    55,967 (23.3%)  2002  184,137 (30.4%)  
1982  175,797 (13.7%)     1989  176,411 (3.7%)      1996  152,190 (22.2%) 
1983  173,932 (13.8%)     1990  185,030 (3.9%)      1997  154,955 (22.2%) 
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1984  177,248 (14.7%)     1991  179,560 (4.4%)      1998  156,990 (23.6%) 
1985  180,232 (14.3%)     1992  176,848 (4.2%)      1999  159,362 (27.6%) 
 
11 A revised version of their paper, due for publication in the Journal of Labor Economics in 2004, exploits the 
unedited earnings data for those years. 
 
12 Although there are some differences in the levels of the wage differences reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 
the majority of these results are consistent with the findings reported by FM in their Figure 3.1.  Major exceptions 
are FM’s finding that wage gaps were higher for men than women and for non-whites compared with whites.  We 
suspect such differences arise because of  the small sample size in the May 1979 CPS of 6,018 used by FM.    
 
13 Nearly all federal workers have wages set by civil service pay schedules, but these are not set by collective 
bargaining in any meaningful sense.  Even with workers in the exact same federal job, one will say she is a unin 
member and the other will say she is not.  Thus the low union premium for federal workers may not be very 
meaningful.  For state and local workers (and some groups of federal workers like postal workers) the union status 
variable provides meaningful information.  We thank Barry Hirsch for this point. 
 
14 Tables for the analyses presented in this section are available from the authors. 
 
15   We have added data for 2002 as the 2002 ORG has recently become available. 
 
16 The May extracts of the CPS extracts in Stata format from 1969-1987 are available from the NBER at 
http://www.nber.org/data/cps_may.html. 
 
17 Hirsch, Macpherson, and Schumacher (2002) have compared union wage gap estimates obtained from the BLS 
quarterly Employment Cost Index (ECI) constructed from establishment surveys and from the annual Employer 
Costs for Employee Compensation (ECEC) with those obtained using the CPS.  They find that union/non-union 
wage trends in the three series ‘are consistent neither with each other nor with the CPS’, and ultimately conclude  
that ‘we find ourselves relying most heavily on results drawn from the CPS’ (Hirsch, Macpherson, and Schumacher, 
2002, p.23).  
 
18  There was no CPS survey with wages and union status in 1982.  
 
19  Following Mincer, it is more usual to include a term in potential experience rather than a direct measure of age.  
We use education, however, for reasons of comparability as the CPS Outgoing Rotation Group files from 1993 
report qualifications rather than years of schooling.  
 
20 Similarly in the 2003 edition of Hirsch and Macpherson’s Union Membership and Earnings Data Book, recently 
received. 
 
21 There is a dissonance between the estimates Lewis offers by way of summary in his introductory chapter and 
those given in his Table 9.7 which are produced here (Lewis, 1986, p. 9). 
 
22 Lewis (1986) had 35 studies using the CPS, 1970-1979; 16 studies using the 1967 Survey of Economic 
Opportunity; 25 studies using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 1967-78; 15 studies using Michigan Survey 
Research Center survey data other than the PSID, including the 1972-73 Quality of Employment Survey; 22 studies 
using the National Longitudinal Surveys of 1969-72; and 8 studies exploiting other sources. 
 
23 FM’s smaller sample sizes by industry could account for some of the greater variation in their estimates. 
 
24  Bratsberg and Ragan (2002) also use CPS data.  But their analysis differs in several ways.  First, they assess 
trends over the period 1971-1999 whereas we present trends over the period 1983-2001.  Second, we adjust for wage 
imputation as recommended by Hirsch and Schumacher (2002) whereas Bratsberg and Ragan do not.  Third, 
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specifications producing the regression-adjusted estimates differ somewhat.  Fourth, the samples differ.  In 
particular, Bratsberg and Ragan exclude government workers and they present results for some different industries. 
Fifth, their wage premium relates to weekly wages whereas all of our estimates are derived from (log) hourly wages. 
 
25  The import penetration variables are calculated as the ratio of imports to industry shipments.  Bratsberg and 
Ragan (2002) in their footnote 19 report that they tabulated shipments through 1994 from Feenstra (1996) and 
thereafter from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Merchandise Trade, series FT900 (December) and 
Manufactures’ Shipments, Inventories and Orders (http://www.census.gov)  
 
26 When the equations are run on the two machines using OLS they are identical.  The problem appears to arise from 
the different tolerances used across computers and not from differences in the STATA programs. 
 
27 According to the 2002 Human Development Report Table 5 (http://hdr.undp.org/)  the population of the US in 
2000 was 283.2 million compared with 60.6 million in the UK and 7.2 million in Switzerland. 
 
28 He finds wages of highly unionized occupations in Las Vegas’s hotel and gaming industry are significantly higher 
than wages of identical occupations in less unionized Reno. 
 
29 The source of the data is the Union Membership and Coverage Database which is an Internet data resource 
providing private and public sector union membership, coverage, and density estimates compiled from the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) using BLS methods.  Economy-wide estimates are provided beginning in 1973; estimates 
by state, detailed industry, and detailed occupation begin in 1983; and estimates by metropolitan area begin in 1986.  
The Database, constructed by Barry Hirsch (Trinity University) and David Macpherson (Florida State University), 
is updated annually.  The Database can be accessed at http://www.unionstats.com.  
  
30 The main exceptions are Maine, Hawaii and Vermont which are small and which had increases in the wage gap.  
Florida is the fourth largest state after California, Texas and New York but its differential declined by 10 percentage 
points. 
 
31 Source: http://data.bls.gov/labjava/outside.jsp?survey=la 
 
32 We experimented with both the level of the unemployment rate and the log and the latter always worked best.  
 
33 According to Peter Hart Associates, the percentage of non-members saying they would vote to form a union hit 
50% in 2002, the highest percentage since their figures began in 1984 (when the figure was only 30%).  See 
http://www.aflcio.org/mediacenter/resources/upload/LaborDay2002Poll.ppt. 